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THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE
Gross physical abuse is only one segment of a much wider problem
of parental neglect. The unloved child, the emotionally trauma-
tized child, the socially and emotionally deprived child, become
a part of our neurotic, disturbed, retarded, or delinquent adults.'
During the past decade, the American public has become increasingly
aware of the problem of child abuse.2 The mass media has played a
significant role in bringing the problem to the attention of the public.3
It is only in the recent past, however, that even the medical profession
has comprehended the scope of the problem in our society.4 Physicians
have identified certain clinical symptoms frequently discovered during
the examination of abused children. The term "child abuse syndrome"
has become associated with this phenomenon, and significant medical
progress has been made in the identification of victims of child abuse.
Identification of victims and discovery of the scope of the problem
by the medical profession, however, was only the first step toward what
will ultimately be a solution to a complex medical-legal-social problem.
Professional sociologists and social workers have taken an interest in the
problem, 5 and legal scholars have examined the contributions that the
law might make toward its amelioration.6
1. Bain, The Physically Abused Child, 31 PEDIATRICS 895, 897 (1963).
2. For the purposes of this note, the term "child abuse" is intended to include both
positive abusive conduct toward the child, and neglect of the child in cases where a
duty of care exists toward a child.
3. See, e.g., Coles, Terror Struck Children, NEw REPuBLIC, May 30, 1964, at 13;
Flato, Parents Who Beat Children, SATURDAY EVENING PosT, Oct. 6, 1962, at 30; Oet-
tinger, Protecting Children From Abuse, PARENTs MAGAZINE, Nov, 1964, at 12. For
a comprehensive analysis of the role of the mass media in the formulation of legislative
responses to the problem of child abuse see Paulsen, Parker, & Adelman, Child Abuse
Reporting Laws-Some Legislative History, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 482 (1966).
4. See, e.g., V. FoNTANA, THm MALTREATRD CHILD: Tim MATREATED SYNDROME IN
CHILDREN (1964); Bain, supra, note 1; Editorial, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181
J.A.M-A. 42 (1962); Gwinn, Lewin, & Peterson, Roentgenographic Manifestations of
Unsuspected Trauma in Infancy, 176 J.A.MA. 926 (1961).
5. See, e.g., Elmer, Identification of Abused Children, 10 CHILDREN 183 (1963);
Morris, Gould, & Matthews, Toward Prevention of Child Abuse, 11 CMLDREN 59 (1964);
Rubin, The Need for Intervention, 24 Put. WELFARE 231 (1966).
6. See, e.g., Carpenter, The Parent-Child Dilemma in the Courts, 30 Omo ST. LJ. 292
(1969); DeFrancis, Child Abuse-The Legislative Response, 44 DENVER L.J. 3 (1967);
McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family: Part One, 50
MINN. L. REv. 1. (1965); Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of Legis-
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Thus far, the most important contribution made by the law has been
the enactment of child abuse reporting statutes. These statutes, usually
reflecting one of four model statutes,7 have now been enacted in all
fifty states. Their objective is the identification of individual victims
of abuse so that the resources of the state may be used to protect and
assist the child. The identification of the victim, however, does not
solve the problem, but is only the first step in the development of a
meaningful solution.
Other than the previously mentioned statutes, the law has continued to
operate in the areas in which it has been traditionally associated with
children and their problems. A rather simplistic approach has been taken
in the area of criminal law by increasing the punishment for those who
batter children, or by the enactment of statutes which make child abuse
a crime separate from common law battery. In many cases, these statutes
have undoubtedly been the result of some particularly shocking and bru-
tal incident that has come to the attention of the legislature. While there
is some validity to this approach in cases in which the batterer is a
stranger to the child, severe criminal sanctions in instances in which
the abuser is a parent or one in loco parentis, the vast majority of
instances, may have a detrimental effect. It has been argued s that the
severe punishment of a parent is likely to create resentment toward the
child and place him in even greater danger. Therefore, in cases in which
the child is to remain in his previous environment, it does not seem wise
to take action that is likely to aggravate an already poor situation.
Juvenile court acts generally provide that, upon evidence of abuse
or neglect, the court may order the child's removal from the abusive
environment or assume "protective supervision" of the abused child.9
Often, however, these solutions are more illusory than real, since, in
most cases, a juvenile court judge has no place to "put" the abused
child. The under-financed and under-staffed institutions do not provide
lation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1967); Paulsen, Parker, & Adelman, supra note 3; Shepard,
The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 182 (1965).
7. AmuRAN MEDIcAL Ass'N, PHYSICAL ABusE oF CmLDREN-SuGGESTED LEGISLATION
(1965); CHILDREN'S BUREAu, U.S. DEPr. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PRINCIPLES
AND SUGGEsTE LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORTING OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED
CHILD (1963); CHILDREN'S DVsION, AMERICAN HumANE Ass'N, GumEI FOR LEnis-
LATION TO PROTECT THE BATERF. CHILD (1963); COMMIrTEE OF STATE OFFICIALS ON SUG-
GESTED STATE LEGISLATION, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION
(1965).
8. Daly, Willful Child Abuse and State Reporting Statutes, 23 U. Mzrm L. REv. 283,
297 (1969).
9. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-166 (Replacement Vol. 1960).
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a viable alternative to the parents, save in cases of the most flagrant
abuse. The same may be said of "protective supervision," since the
caseloads of the social workers ultimately responsible for supervision are
frequently too heavy. In short, juvenile court judges are often faced
with choosing between two undesirable alternatives: leaving the child
in an environment in which he has already been abused, or placing him
in an institution which cannot provide the type of environment a de-
veloping child needs. There are cases, however, in which the child must
be removed for its own protection, and courts have reexamined former
attitudes concerning the relationships between parent, child, and society
with an increasing tendency to protect the child at the expense of
parental "rights" in the child.10
Child abuse reporting statutes are unlikely to be successful as a solu-
tion unless society is willing to allocate the resources necessary to pro-
vide quality institutional alternatives to returning an abused child to
the source of the abuse, and unless courts continue to reexamine some
legal principles with regard to the conflicting rights of the parents,
the child, and society.
IDENTIFYING THE VICTIM-THE REPORTING STATUTES
The reporting statutes, the basic objective of which is the identifica-
tion of the abused child, all have certain fundamental elements in com-
mon. First, a designated class of persons is either required or permitted
to report suspected cases of child abuse. Secondly, these reports are to
be made to designated public officials, who, presumably, take some
remedial action. Thirdly, the statutes typically require an oral report
by telephone followed by a written one describing the injuries and
providing other data on the child and his family situation. Reports are
made either to the appropriate law enforcement authorities, the juvenile
court, or the local welfare department.
A distinction must be made at the outset among those statutes that
make reporting mandatory by imposing criminal penalties for failure
to report," those which use the mandatory language "shall" but fail to
provide any penalty for failure to report, 2 and those which are per-
10. E.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
11. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 25 (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. AN. § 9:6-8.7 (Supp.
1969-70).
12. E.g., IDAHo CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE AwN. § 16.1-217.1 to 217.2
(Supp. 1968).
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missive, that is, that extend immunity to the reporter if he chooses to
report, but impose no sanction for failure to report.'3 A hybrid type
of statute levies requirements on some classes of reporters, while merely
permitting others to report if they so choose. 14
The statutes also vary as to the classes of persons who are either re-
quired orpermitted to report. Physicians are included in all statutes.
Other classes of health personnel, such as registered nurses, 5 visiting
nurses,' 6 practical nurses,' 7 school nurses, 8 public health nurses,19 phar-
macists, 1 laboratory technicians,21 and others22 may also be included.
If the physician or nurse examines the child in his capacity as a staff
member of a hospital or clinic, provision is often made for the admin-
istrator or superintendent to do the actual reporting to the appropriate
officials. 23 Other classes typically included are those in frequent contact
13. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (Supp. 1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.010,
26.44.060 (Supp. 1969).
14. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 235 A.3 (1965) provides that health practitioners "shall"
report, and that any other person "may" report.
15. E.g., HAwAii REv. STAT. § 350-1 (1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (1965).
16. MoNT. REV. CODE AaN. § 10-902 (2d Replacement Vol. 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-9-13 (Replacement Vol. 1968).
17. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § IlA(b) (1) (Supp. 1969); Mottr. REv. CODEs ANN. § 10-901
(2d Replacement Vol. 1968).
18. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105 (Supp.
1969-70).
19. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a) (Supp. 1969); ND. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (Supp.
1969).
20. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (Supp. 1969);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626354(2) (1967); WASH. RFv. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030(1) (Supp.
1969).
21. E.g., A.Pa. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1419 (Supp.
1969).
22. ALAsKA STAT. § 11.67.010(a) (Supp. 1969) (practitioner of the healing arts); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1968) (religious practitioner); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,
§ 2042 (1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(b) (1) (Supp. 1969) (other persons authorized
to engage in the practice of healing); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105 (Supp. 1969-70); N.Y.
Soc. SERVICES LAW § 383A(1) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 26.44.030(1) (Supp. 1969) (psychologist). The term "physician" generally includes
those who are licensed by the jurisdiction to practice healing, as well as residents and
interns whether licensed or not. Therefore, it normally includes doctors of medicine,
dentists, osteopathic physicians, chiropractors, podiatrists, optometric physicians, and
chiropodists.
23. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (Supp. 1969-70); VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-217.1 (Supp.
1968).
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with children, such as school teachers, 24 principals, 25 and administrators, 26
as well as social workers,27 clergymen, 28 and law enforcement officers. 29
Occasionally, other classes of persons are specifically included. 0 Five
jurisdictions"' make the requirement universal by providing that "any
person" shall report such abuses.
To encourage the reporting of child abuse, the statutes provide the
reporter with immunity in civil defamation actions, as well as any
criminal proceeding arising out of the report. The immunity granted
falls into one of three categories. The first provides immunity if the
reporter acts in good faith.32 The second category not only provides
immunity if the report was made in good faith, but additionally pre-
sumes that the report was made in good faith.33 Finally, some statutes
grant absolute immunity to reporters.3 4 The official designated to re-
ceive the initial report is also granted immunity. Many jurisdictions
provide for reporting to law enforcement agencies or prosecuting at-
torneys.35 Frequently, these officials are required to report, in turn, to
24. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151-421 (Page Supp. 1970); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 49-6A-2 (1966).
25. E.g., CAL. PENAL § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1968); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 9 17-38a(a)
(Supp. 1969).
26. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN.
9 48.981 (1) (Supp. 1969).
27. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 11.67.010(b) (Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 38-717 (Supp.
1969).
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (Replacement Vol. 1968); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 26.44.030(1) (Supp. 1969).
29. E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 26-10-10 (1967); TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. art. 695c-2
(Supp. 1969-70).
30. E.g., HAWAn REv. STAT. § 350-1 (1968) (coroner); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105
(Supp. 1969-70) ("others with the responsibility for care of children for financial re-
muneration . . ."); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 695c-2 (Supp. 1969-70) (coroners and
nursery school directors); NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.502(d) (1965) (attorneys).
31. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (1966); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-481 (Supp. 1967);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (Supp 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2 (Supp. 1969); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 14-28.1 (1965).
32. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1004 (Supp. 1969-70); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041(4)
(1965).
33. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2045 (1968); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.573
(1968).
34. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-6 (1963); PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 2107 (Supp. 1970).
35. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01 (A) (Supp. 1969-70); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
9 14:403(B) (Supp. 1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (1966).
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some public welfare agency; 6 other jurisdictions provide for reporting
directly to a public welfare agency.37 In many instances, these agencies
are required to investigate the incidents and report to law enforcement
authorities if criminal prosecution is warranted.38 A third type of statute
requires that reports be made directly to the court having jurisdiction
over juvenile affairs, which, in turn, directs an appropriate public agency
to investigate the report.39 Still other jurisdictions require reports to
be made simultaneously to both law enforcement and public welfare
officials.40
Reports are usually required to be made immediately by telephone
or otherwise, to be followed, as soon as is practicable, by a written re-
port. Some jurisdictions, however, merely require a written report.41 The
written report is typically required to contain the name and address
of the victim and his parents or others standing in loco parentis, the
victim's age, the nature and extent of his injuries, and any other infor-
mation the reporter believes might be helpful in establishing the cause
of injuries and the person or persons responsible therefor.42
Several jurisdictions have established central registries which receive
copies of the report.43 Experience has demonstrated that abusive par-
ents usually do not bring the child to the same health facility more
than once for treatment of injuries.44 Many instances of abuse go un-
diagnosed because of the mobility of today's society and the physician's
natural reluctance to believe that a parent has abused his child, par-
ticularly when the parent provides some reasonably plausible explana-
tion for the injuries. Data available in central registries is likely to be
an invaluable tool in cases such as these.
Child abuse reporting statutes also provide, in most cases, for the
36. E.g., AiA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1967); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-1 (1963).
37. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2043 (1968).
38. E.g., HAWAI REv. STAT. § 350-1 (1968); RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-13.1-4 (Supp.
1967).
39. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1003 (Supp. 1969-70); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202
(Supp. 1969).
40. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (1966); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852
(Supp. 1970).
41. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 28.041(3) (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-302.2 (Supp. 1969).
42. E.g., HAWAI Ryv. STAT. S 350-1 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.503 (1965).
43. E.g., MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 722.572 (1968); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1
(Page Supp. 1970).
44. See Daly, supra note 8, at 332.
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abrogation of the physician-patient privilege,45 the husband-wife priv-
ilege,46 or both 4 7 in any legal proceedings, civil or criminal, arising
from the report. Other clauses found in reporting statutes provide for
temporary non-judicial removal from custody if the examining physi-
cian and a specified law enforcement official concur that such immediate
action is necessary for the protection of the child.4 In a few jurisdic-
tions, the statutes contain a rather unfortunate provision to the effect
that treatment accorded to an ill child by spiritual means or by prayer
in accordance with the tenets of a recognized religion shall not, for that
reason alone, be deemed neglect within the meaning of the statute. 9
A table summarizing the provisions of the enacted child abuse re-
porting statutes follows on page 968.
THE COMMON LAW CoNTExT
For centuries the young child has been regarded as a chattel of
his parents. By making abortions illegal except under limited cir-
cumstances, civilized society now protects the child in utero. It
should continue giving adequate protection through the early years
of life when the child is still too young to defend himself. 50
Society's response to the problem of child abuse and the efficacy of
child abuse reporting legislation must be viewed in the context of the
common law attitudes toward the relationship between parent, child
and state.51 The right of the parent to physically discipline the child
has been the focus around which much of the law of parent and child
has arisen. The most extreme view seems to be that the parent or one
acting in loco parentis is the sole arbiter of the child's punishment, and
that all punishment that does not result in the disfigurement of, or
45. E.g., AiZ. REV. STAT. AN. S 13-842.01 (C) (Supp. 1969-70); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-719 (1965).
46. IDAHo CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1969); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 695c-2 (Supp.
1969-70).
47. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-805 (Supp. 1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1005 (Supp.
1969-70).
48. E.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-4(2) (1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-13.1
-5(2) (Supp. 1968).
49. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1967) (limited to Christian Science Practitioners);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-166 (Supp. 1969-70); HAWAH Rsv. STAT. § 350-4 (1968); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 571:25 (Supp. 1969); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1. (Page Supp. 1970);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-217.1 (Supp. 1968) (limited to Christian Science Practitioners).
50. Editorial, The Battered Child Syndome, 181 J.A.M.A. 42 (1962).
51. See generally Shepherd, The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
182 (1965).
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permanent injury to the child is per se reasonable. 2 This is clearly the
older view. The majority approach gives a parent the right to punish
a child within the bounds of moderation and reason, as long as he does
so for the welfare of the child. If he exceeds moderation, however, he
becomes criminally liable."
Providing the foundation for this latter view is the Roman law con-
cept of parens patriae: that the state has an interest in the child that is
superior to the parents' or others' standing in loco parentis.4 This is
a difficult concept for a citizen of a democratic society to accept, since it
has so often been associated with totalitarian ideologies. The state, how-
ever, has not hesitated to interfere with the parent-child relationship
when it is in the interest of the state to do so. Compulsory education
and child labor laws are but two examples of such interference. Addi-
tionally, the state has long taken the position that a child can be re-
moved from parental custody in order to protect its morals.55 There
has been an increasing tendency for the state, through its court system,
to interfere with the parent-child relationship in order to protect the
physical health of the child. The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently
approved a lower court's appointment of a guardian for an unborn child
and its order to the mother to submit to blood tranfusions which was
contrary to her religious beliefs.56
REMOVAL OF THE CHILD
Although legal theory no longer obstructs the removal of a child
from an abusive environment, the practical difficulties are great. All
states have statutory provisions giving juvenile courts jurisdiction over
"neglected children," and, although the wording of such statutes varies
widely, it can be stated with certainty that the abused child falls within
this category. These juvenile courts have the power to remove the child
from parental custody in appropriate cases.
The distinction must be drawn between the court's power to sum-
marily remove the child for an emergency purpose, such as medical
(Continued on page 982)
52. See, e.g., Nicholas v. State, 32 Ala. App. 574, 28 So. 2d 422 (1946); Dean v.
State, 89 Ala. 46, 8 So. 38 (1889); Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169, 7 So. 268 (1886).
53. See cases cited in R. PERKINS, CumvNAL LAW 878 (1957); Annot, 89 A.L.R. 2d
396 (1963).
54. See 67 C.J.S. Parens Patrie (1950).
55. E.g., In re Douglas, 11 Ohio App. 2d 340, 164 NE.2d 475 (1959); In re Drake, 87
Ohio L. Abs. 483, 180 N.E.2d 646 (Juv. Ct. 1961).
56. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d
537 (1964).
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attention, and its power to ultimately place the child in a foster home
or an institutional substitute. There are few problems associated with
the exercise of this first power, the most serious of which is locating a
judge in an emergency situation.57 Some jurisdictions, as previously
discussed,-" permit the police or a physician, in conjunction with a law
enforcement officer, to assume temporary custody. The latter situation,
however, poses some significant problems of an evidentiary and a prac-
tical nature. In most courts, a case of child abuse must be established
by a preponderance of the evidence.59 In the face of a denial by the
parent and a child too young to communicate, this may be a difficult
standard to meet. One court has approached this problem by adopting
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur from the law of negligence, allowing
the condition of the child to speak for itself, and thereby permitting an
inference of abuse or neglect.6°
It is when the standard of proof has been met, however, that the
greatest problem is encountered. Except in the rare case in which a
good foster home is available, the judge is faced with the equally un-
acceptable alternatives of returning the child to an environment in which
he has already been abused, or of placing the child in an institution.
Given the conditions prevailing at most institutions, the options open to
the judge are bleak. Normally, the child is returned and "protective
services" are provided by a welfare agency to the child and his family.
Despite the dedication of professional social workers, caseloads prohibit
any meaningful work with the family toward the resolution of what
is an extremely complex psychological and social problem. Herein lies
the dilemma of the abused child: how can he be helped in a society
that is apparently unwilling to provide services or institutions capable
of addressing themselves to his problems?
FACING THE PROBLEM
As Professor Monrad Paulsen points out, "From the standpoint of
a battered child . . . the usefulness of the entire legal framework ulti-
mately depends upon the effectiveness of the interventions for which
the law provides." ,1 The first of these interventions is the child abuse
57. See Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLuTm. L. REv.
679, 695 (1966).
58. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-4(2) (1963); R.1 GEN. LAws ANN. § 13.1-1 (Supp.
1967).
59. See Paulsen, supra note 57, at 697.
60. In the Matter of S., 46 Misc. 2d 161, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Family Ct. 1965).
61. Paulsen, supra note 57, at 697.
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reporting statute. In evaluating the effectiveness of a reporting statute,
the first consideration is a determination as to whether a mandatory or
permissive statute is more effective. Although many of the statutes are
mandatory in that they use the language "shall report" and provide
penalties for failure to do so, the requirement that such a failure must
have been "knowing and willful" 12 leaves the physician a great deal
of latitude in his diagnosis. Still other statutes, although employing
mandatory language, provide no punishment.63 When looked at from
a practical point of view, the reporter, in the final analysis, is likely to
use his own judgment. One salutary effect of mandatory language is
that it provides the physician a "reason" for reporting doubtful cases,
in which the parents stoutly deny abusing the child.6 4 Such language,
in effect, takes the physician "off the hook." Secondly, it provides a
strong statement of public policy and undoubtedly encourages reporting.
On a practical level, however, it probably makes little difference whether
the reporting statute is mandatory or permissive.
The second consideration involves the class of persons either required
or permitted to report, and the persons thereby granted some degree of
immunity from defamation actions. Obviously, physicians and associated
medical personnel should report. How far beyond this class the statute
should go has been the subject of some debate.65 It has been argued that
the wider the class permitted to report, the greater the chance of abuse of
the statute. It has also been argued that only medical personnel are quali-
fied to diagnose child abuse. It is also true, however, that the larger the
class, the more likely that a case of child abuse will be identified. When
coupled with the good faith requirements imposed by a majority of
the statutes, the possibilities of statutory abuse seem minimal in relation to
the salutary effects of increased identification. Reporting should be re-
stricted, however, to those classes of persons who have some relationship
with the child. Hence, school personnel and welfare workers should
clearly be included, since these individuals very often have the child's
confidence. Law enforcement officers who come in contact with the
child in the line of duty should also be included. All of these classes, if
not technically qualified to make a diagnosis of child abuse, are capable
of making rational judgments about the probable source of the injury.
62. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-806 (Supp. 1969); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (1966).
63. IDA-o CoDE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-217.1 to -217.2
(Supp. 1968).
64. See generally McCoid, supra note 6.
65. See generally Daly, supra note 8, at 305.
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Since it is the child the statute seeks ultimately to protect, it would seem
appropriate to permit this wider class to report.
Reporters should have the alternative of reporting to either public
welfare agencies, law enforcement agencies, or both. A requirement that
reports be made to a law enforcement agency is unwise since it is likely
to discourage such reports in situations in which the abuse is relatively
minor and social casework is indicated. Many physicians are reluctant
to report to law enforcement agencies6  if the child is to remain in the
home since criminal sanctions against the offending parent are likely
to cause further resentment toward the child. Such a physician, how-
ever, might be willing to report the incident to a welfare agency in the
hope that the child would receive assistance. On the other hand, the
reporter should have the option of making a report to a law enforce-
ment agency if he feels the abuse was severe and that the child is still in
danger.
The establishment of central registries is a useful diagnostic tool for
the physician. It is not without dangers, however. Reports filed in
such a registry may be mistaken, or, in rare instances, intentionally false.
In cases in which the determination is made that the parent has not
been abusive, mechanisms must exist for removal of the report. Addi-
tionally, access to the information in the registry must be restricted to
members of the medical profession who seek the information in a pro-
fessional capacity as part of a diagnosis.
The encouragement of child abuse reporting can best be accomplished
by a statute that grants immunity to a reporter who acts in good faith.
Absolute immunity is neither necessary nor desirable since it only serves
to protect those who would abuse the statute. The presumption of good
faith should adequately protect the mistaken reporter, while encouraging
those who might otherwise be reluctant to report for fear of legal
liability.
Statutes specifically abrogating the physician-patient or husband-wife
privileges, although probably unnecessary,67 are nevertheless desirable
so as to leave no doubt that such testimony is admissible. The physician-
patient privilege belongs to the child, and the accused parent would
have no standing to invoke it. Further, in most jurisdictions 8 the hus-
66. McCoid, supra note 6, at 51.
67. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 CoLuM.
L. Rav. 1, 37 (1967).
68. E.g., N.J.R. EvEDENCE 23(2) provides that a spouse shall not testify in a criminal
action against the other spouse unless "(b) such spouse and the accused is charged
[Vol. 11:960
Legal Response to Cbild Abuse
band-wife privilege is not applicable in proceedings involving the chil-
dren of the marriage.
Both oral and written reports should be made. The necessity of an
immediate report in cases in which the child remains in danger of further
abuse is obvious. The need for a more comprehensive written report
also exists, both for the benefit of the welfare agency that will investi-
gate the incident, and for the purposes of the central registry.
It would also be beneficial to provide for the assumption of custody
on a temporary basis until the matter can be brought to the attention
of the appropriate judicial authority. Provisions authorizing the as-
sumption of temporary custody of the child upon the concurrence of a
physician and a law enforcement officer would be responsive to this
problem, although it is not difficult to envision situations in which the
safety of a child might depend upon the summary assumption of custody
by a law enforcement officer alone.69
There seems to be no valid reason why these statutes should only
extend to children below a certain age. The test should be whether the
abused party is mentally capable of defending or reporting the abuse
himself. Hence, some states have included invalids, the mentally in-
competent, and the retarded within the purview of the reporting require-
ment.70 The helplessness of the victim is a more valid indicator of his
need than is his age.
Perhaps the most unfortunate and ill-advised provisions of child abuse
reporting statutes are those which provide that a child is not to be deemed
neglected merely because he is being treated by spiritual means, through
prayer according to the tenets of a recognized religion.71 By enacting
such provisions, the legislature is suggesting that the child is nothing
but a chattel of his parents, subject to any whims of bad judgment that
they may wish to entertain. As has been indicated, the courts have
tended to depart from this view. Undoubtedly, these provisions reflect
a concern for the parent's rights under the free exercise clause of the
with an offense against the spouse, a child of the accused or of the spouse, or a
child to whom the accused stands in the place of a parent."
69. An Arizona court has held that a peace officer has a duty to do so in such a
situation. State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 P.2d 208 (1965).
70. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-481 (Supp. 1967); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Page
Supp. 1970); WAsH. REv. CODE A N. § 26.44.020(6) (Supp. 1969).
71. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1967); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-166 (Supp. 1969-70);
HAwMI REv. STAT. § 350-4 (1968); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 571:25 (Supp. 1969); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Page Supp. 1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-217.1 (Replacement
Vol. 1960).
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Constitution; the free exercise clause is not absolute.72 It is not the right
of the parent to follow his chosen pattern of religious behavior that is
being interfered with, but rather the elementary rights of the child to
live and be healthy that the state is protecting on behalf of the child.
The parent may follow whatever course he wishes with regard to his
own health, but he should not be permitted to dictate manifestly unrea-
sonable and inadequate solutions for a helpless child. Provisions such as
these are steps away from a solution of this significant social problem.
CONCLUSION
Behind "closed doors" a countless number of helpless young chil-
dren and infants are being abused, neglected, and often "battered"
by parents or other individuals in the family. These children are
beaten with a variety of instruments, ranging from bare fists to
baseball bats; others are being burned over open flames, gas burn-
.ers and cigarette lighters. Some children are strangled, others are
suffocated by pillows or plastic bags; and some are being
drowned.73
Child abuse reporting statutes, by identifying the victims of abuse, make
a significant contribution toward the amelioration of this widespread
and serious problem in our society. The identification of the victim is,
however, only the first step. Courts must come to grips with the modern
notion of giving children rights independent of those of their parents.
In other words, courts must cease viewing children as chattels of their
parents. Less attention must be given the rights of the parent, and
more to the independent rights of the child. Most important, however,
society must be willing to allocate the resources necessary to provide
institutions capable of coping with the problem. Not until society col-
lectively decides that its children are to be valued as greatly as its high-
72. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the ac-
ceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the
other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
Thus the amendment embraces two concepts-Freedom to believe and free-
dom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be.
,Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (emphasis added).
73. Preface to V. FoNrANA, THE BATTERED CHILD (1964).
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ways and weapons will any truly meaningful progress be made toward
the eradication of this shocking social problem.
THOMAS J. DONOVAN
